It made sense to the strategists and diplomats of the three countries, that the French would make their first effort against the lesser of their three possible foes and secure their flanks by either political or military means before taking on the greater of their enemies. With Laos firmly in their possession, the French would be free to menace Siam and force negotiations, and perhaps even a protectorate upon the Siamese as well, from a position of strength. The French however could not completely count on that very desireable result, as Siam had made clear that Laos falling under a French protectorate or outright conquest would mean war. The problem for Siam would of course be on which front to concentrate their own efforts, either assisting Laos directly or invading Cambodia and a possible drive on Saigon, the administrative and logisitical center of French rule in Indo-China.
The French had begun a slow, steady build up of their military and naval forces in Indo-China since 1886 both to protect what they had and to contain any possible future revolts or insurrections against their continued rule in Cambodia, Cochin-china, Annam, Tonkin and Hainan. They had raised numerous units of colonial tirailleurs, zouves and mountain artillery from the four provinces and the island, as well as shipped in still more regiments and battalions of Marine Infantry and Légion étrangère demi-brigades from elsewehere. The French had also shipped in considerable stocks of military equipement, armaments and munitions to ensure their forces in Indo-China were well supplied in all the particulars needed for extended campaigning.
The French had dealt similarly with their naval and colonial army controlled aeronautical forces, which was almost as worrying a development from a Chinese perspective. France was a world leader and trend setter in civil and military aeronautical developments, when all was said and done. The bulk of the Chinese Imperial air services were equiped with older though not necessarily obsolete equipments and much new construction and instruction with aircraft of German or Austrian origins was underway. Imperial Chinese air units could be expected to give a good account of themselves in any coming war, just on sheer numbers alone compared to the air forces the French had immediately at their disposal in Indo-China.
The biggest concern was the build up of French naval units in the region. So far, the French naval formations in Indo-China, had been largely confined to various existing squadrons of armoured, protected and light cruisers, gunvessels and gunboats and the like. Although they had considerably increased the number of torpedo cruisers, torpedo gunboats, destroyers and torpedoboats available for fleet, coastal and harbour defense, the French Admiralty had not deployed any of Marine Nationale's heavy capital ships to Saigon, which was puzzling to both the Imperial Qing government and the Imperial Admiralty. True, they had deployed a great number of ironclad rams and coastal defense battleships to Indo-China which enhanced the French Republic's ability to protect their most important Indo-chinese harbours. That said, these ships while powerful were not really that useful for operations in the wider South China Sea or the further north East China Sea and Yellow Sea regions except in a limited supporting role for coastal and some riverine operations.
It had been suggested that the French were leary of telegraphing their intentions in the region by sending their battleships in any sort of pre-war build up. The previous wars between France and China, had generally been conducted with forces already on site with reinforcements from France only coming after any conflict had already started. French constitutional strictures, which forbade any units of the French Metropolitian Army from being deployed overseas in peacetime, probably had a great deal to do with this, the young emperor reflected. Though, no such prohibition hindered the French Republican Navy or the Colonial Army both of which were controlled by the French Ministry of the Marine and the Colonies.
What did hinder them however, was the violitle political and civilian public opinion back home in France, which was not in favour of a war anywhere at the moment. The trials and costs of the previous Sino-French conflicts in 1882, 1883 and 1884-85, the Annam Revolt of 1886 and the horrors of the Franco-German War of 1881-82, were still fresh in the minds of the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate and French voters. Ongoing colonial and economic conflicts with the Tukulor and Wassalou Empires in West Africa also at present absorded much of the French government's attentions. Further the idea and fear that if France deployed it's most powerful naval forces so far from home, other great powers in Europe would see a chance to take advantage of France's distraction. Specifically, the worry being either Great Britain or the Triple Alliance of the Central Powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy would move to exploit any French political or military weakness. Which was not all that unreasonable a fear in the circumstances, given that the twin motors of French national paranoia at the moment was raving Anglophobia and Germanophobia.
