It made sense to the strategists and diplomats of the three countries, that the French would make their first effort against the lesser of their three possible foes and secure their flanks by either political or military means before taking on the greater of their enemies. With Laos firmly in their possession, the French would be free to menace Siam and force negotiations, and perhaps even a protectorate upon the Siamese as well, from a position of strength. The French however could not completely count on that very desireable result, as Siam had made clear that Laos falling under a French protectorate or outright conquest would mean war. The problem for Siam would of course be on which front to concentrate their own efforts, either assisting Laos directly or invading Cambodia and a possible drive on Saigon, the administrative and logisitical center of French rule in Indo-China.
The French had begun a slow, steady build up of their military and naval forces in Indo-China since 1886 both to protect what they had and to contain any possible future revolts or insurrections against their continued rule in Cambodia, Cochin-china, Annam, Tonkin and Hainan. They had raised numerous units of colonial tirailleurs, zouves and mountain artillery from the four provinces and the island, as well as shipped in still more regiments and battalions of Marine Infantry and Légion étrangère demi-brigades from elsewehere. The French had also shipped in considerable stocks of military equipement, armaments and munitions to ensure their forces in Indo-China were well supplied in all the particulars needed for extended campaigning.
-- WORK IN PROGRESS.
